The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of Morals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface only, but penetrates to its deepest roots.

It seems, therefore, only just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he nevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-582 of the fifth, edition); but it is still more clearly expounded in the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (fourth edition, pp. 169-179; R., pp. 224-231).

The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by motives as they arise,