The Basis of Morality by Part 2 Chapter 6 Page 18

basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a “dignity” that they would be quite satisfied. Let us, however, look at this conception a little more carefully, and submit it to the test of reality. Kant (p. 79; R., p. 66) defines dignity as “an unconditioned, incomparable value.” This is an explanation which makes such an effect by its magnificent sound that one does not readily summon up courage to examine it at close quarters; else we should find that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within which there lurks like a gnawing worm, the contradictio in adjecto.

Every value is the estimation of one thing compared with another; it is thus a conception